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URING the Survey period, the Texas appellate courts handed down
numerous decisions construing various rules of civil evidence. The
cases of greatest significance arose in the following substantive ar-
eas: (1) Article I - General Provisions; (2) Article II - Judicial Notice; (3)
Burden of Proof, Presumptions, and Inferences; (4) Article IV -Relevancy
and Its Limits; (5) Article V - Privileges; (6) Article VI - Witnesses; (7)
Article VII -Opinions and Expert Testimony; (8) Article VIII - Hearsay; (9)
Article IX - Authentication and Identification; (10) Article X - Contents of
Writings, Recordings, and Photographs; and (11) Parol Evidence.
I. ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be
predicated upon a ruling admitting or excluding evidence unless a substan-
tial right of a party is affected.' In Western Co. of North America v. Southern
Pacific Transportation Co.2 the Austin court of appeals held that in the ab-
sence of a special exception, Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a) permitted a
party that had plead a general allegation of contributory negligence to intro-
duce evidence of any specific ground of negligence.3
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be
predicated on a ruling excluding evidence unless the substance of the evi-
dence was made known to the court by offer. 4 In Hartford Insurance Co. v.
Jiminez,5 a Houston court of appeals held that where plaintiff did not show
the content of excluded expert testimony by a bill of exception, he did not
preserve his challenge to the exclusion of the expert testimony for appellate
review under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 103(a)(2). 6
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 104 governs preliminary questions of admis-
sibility.7 In determining preliminary questions of admissibility, the trial
court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privi-
© Linda L. Addison 1993.
*J.D. University of Texas. Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski, Houston, Texas.
1. TEX. R. Cv. EvID. 103(a).
2. 819 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
3. Id. at 955.
4. TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 103(a)(2).
5. 814 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1991, no writ).
6. Id. at 552.
7. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 104.
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leges. 8 In Utica National Insurance Co. of Texas v. McDonald,9 the Fort
Worth court of appeals rejected an argument that because Rule 104 provides
that a trial court is not bound by the rules of evidence in determining prelim-
inary questions of admissibility, the evidentiary prerequisites for admission
of co-conspirators' statements were eliminated. The Utica court explained
that Rule 104(a) does not change the common-law requirement that hearsay
evidence of conspiracy is admitted only when accompanied by tangible, ma-
terial evidence of the conspiracy. 10
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 105(a) provides that "[w]hen evidence
which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissi-
ble as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct
the jury accordingly."'I In the absence of such a request, the court's
action in admitting evidence without limitation is not a grounds for
complaint on appeal. 12
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry13 the Texarkana court of appeals held that
where statements of two Sam's employees were admitted over a general
hearsay objection and the objecting party did not request any limiting in-
struction, it was not error to admit the testimony for all purposes.14
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 106, commonly known as the "rule of op-
tional completeness," provides that when a party introduces a written or
recorded statement, an adverse party may at that time introduce any other
part or any other written or recorded statement that ought in fairness to be
considered contemporaneously.1 5 The Texarkana court of appeals consid-
ered the proper remedy under Rule 106 when one party offers a videotaped
deposition presenting testimony out of the chronological sequence in which
it was given in Jones v. Colley. 16 At issue in Colley was whether the trial
court erred in excluding plaintiff's offer of a videotaped deposition simply
because the plaintiff elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to put the questions
and answers in a particular order. 17 Defendants argued on appeal that the
videotape was properly excluded under the rule of optional completeness,
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 106.18 The Texarkana court disagreed and
held that defendants had no right to prevent the use of the edited video-
tape.' 9 The Texarkana court explained that under Rule 106, defendants'
remedy was to introduce the unedited deposition or their own edited version
8. Id. at 104(a).
9. 814 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied). For additional discus-
sion of this case, see infra, text accompanying notes 211-12, and 247-49.
10. Id. at 236, (citing Daggett v. Farmers' National Bank, 259 S.W. 198, 202 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1923), affd, 2 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't adopted)).
11. TEX. R. Cv. EvID. 105(a).
12. Id.
13. 833 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ requested).
14. Id. at 593.
15. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 106.
16. 820 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).






II. ARTICLE II - JUDICIAL NOTICE
Article II of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs judicial notice.
During the Survey period, one court affirmed a trial court's judicial notice of
the bankruptcy status of a manufacturer of asbestos products. 21 Another
court took judicial notice that there was no legislatively established statutory
probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising juris-
diction of a probate court in a particular county.22 The Tyler court of ap-
peals held that whether Highway 96 North links Center and the neighboring
Shelby County community of Tenaha is a fact of such notoriety that there
was no need for an accompanying request for judicial notice with additional
information. 2 3
In May v. May24 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that a trial court
may not judicially notice or even consider testimony taken at a previous
hearing of the same case unless such testimony is admitted into evidence. 25
In Marble Slab Creamery, Inc. v. Wesic, Inc. ,26 a Houston court of appeals
held that a trial court is entitled to take judicial notice of its own records
where the same subject matter between the same parties is involved. 27
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code section 38.004 permits a court to
take judicial notice of usual and customary attorney's fees in a proceeding
before the court. 28 During the Survey period, a Houston court of appeals
held that even when a plaintiff did not request the trial court to take judicial
notice, and the trial court did not announce that it had done so, a reviewing
court may nevertheless presume that the trial court took judicial notice of
reasonable attorney's fees. 29
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 204 permits a court, either upon its own
motion or upon the motion of a party, to take judicial notice of Texas munic-
ipal and county ordinances, the contents of the Texas Register, and of the
codified agency rules published in the Administrative Code.30 During the
Survey period, the San Antonio court of appeals took judicial notice of the
charter of the City of San Antonio, even though the trial court was not re-
20. Id.
21. Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 695 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ
denied). For additional discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes 54-57, 71-74,
and 185-88.
22. Eppenauer v. Eppenauer, 831 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
23. Apostolic Church v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 833 S.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
24. 829 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
25. Id. at 376.
26. 823 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
27. Id. at 439.
28. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 1992).
29. Ross v. 3D Tower Ltd., 824 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
writ denied).
30. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 204.
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quested to do so and did not announce that it had done so. 31 The Austin
court of appeals refused to take judicial notice of a challenged municipal
ordinance that had not been included in the record of the trial court pro-
ceeding in Metro Fuels, Inc. v. City of Austin.3 2 The Austin court explained
that because municipal and county ordinances were difficult to research and
verify, there would be no assurance that the version submitted to the appeals
court was the same version considered by the trial court in this case in which
the validity of the ordinance was issue.33 In Hollingsworth v. King3 4 the
Amarillo court of appeals also refused to take judicial notice on appeal of
unauthenticated copies of municipal ordinances. 35
III. BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES
Article III of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses presumptions. Be-
cause the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence lack a corresponding article III,
Texas common law continues to govern the law of presumptions. During
the Survey period, the Austin court of appeals reiterated that when a party
has the burden to prove a fact, no affirmative evidence is required to support
its non-existence or to permit a negative finding on the issue.3 6
IV. ARTICLE IV - RELEVANCE AND ITS LIMITS
Article IV of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs relevancy and its
limits. 37 Relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
constitution, by statute, or by other rules. 38 Evidence that is not relevant is
not admissible. 39
In State v. Malone Service Co.,4° a civil environmental enforcement ac-
tion, the Texas Supreme Court considered the relevance of certain evidence
to the defense of discriminatory enforcement. At trial, Malone had sought
to support its claim of discriminatory enforcement with an enforcement log
generated by the Texas Water Commission. The log listed the names of hun-
dreds of companies against which the Commission had some type of enforce-
ment activity under the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Malone contended that
six of the companies were customers and investors of one of Malone's com-
petitors, the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority. Although all six had
been classified by the Commission as large polluters, Malone claimed that
the log showed that the Commission had taken enforcement action against
31. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local 624 v. City of San Antonio, 822 S.W.2d
122, 127 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
32. 827 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
33. Id. at 532.
34. 810 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991), writ denied per curiam, 816 S.W.2d 340
(Tex. 1991).
35. Id. at 774.
36. Slentz v. American Airlines, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ
denied).
37. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 402.
38. Id. For the definition of relevance, see id. 401.
39. Id. 402.
40. 829 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 464 (1992).
1032 [Vol. 46
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only four of the six companies and had assessed no penalties in any of those
cases. Malone contended that the state's enforcement action against it was
motivated solely to benefit the Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Authority.
The trial court sustained the state's objection to the log and admitted the
log with the columns reflecting the penalties assessed and collected excised. 41
On appeal, Malone argued that the trial court had erred in excluding the
evidence of penalties assessed against Malone's competitors. The court of
appeals agreed, explaining that the excised column should have been admit-
ted in support of Malone's defense of discriminatory enforcement. 42 The
Texas Supreme Court disagreed and held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in excluding the penalty amounts in the enforcement log. 43
The court explained that "[e]vidence will generally be relevant to the defense
of discriminatory enforcement if it tends to show either that the government
has singled the defendant out for prosecution or that the government has
acted on the basis of impermissible considerations. '"4 The court held that,
as a matter of law, the evidence offered by Malone failed to establish the
defense of discriminatory enforcement.4 5 The court explained that Malone
offered no evidence suggesting that benefits to Gulf Coast would flow di-
rectly to the state, nor any evidence suggesting that the state's action against
Malone was based on race, religion, or any other impermissible
consideration. 46
Several courts of appeals also considered the relevance of certain evidence.
In a former employee's action against his former employer to recover for
breach of an implied employment contract, the Texarkana court of appeals
found that the trial court had properly admitted evidence of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement purporting to be the exclusive contract between
members of the International Electrical Workers Union and the former em-
ployer.4 7 The Texarkana court explained that because the Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement purported to be the exclusive contract, it was relevant to
the former employee's assertion that he had had a separate agreement. The
court explained that the Agreement was also relevant to the former em-
ployer's assertion that there had been no separate agreement and that federal
law preempted the former employee's claim.48 The Texarkana court also
explained that the former employee's failure to pursue an appeal through the
grievance procedure was relevant to the former employer's contention that
he had voluntarily resigned. 49 In another former employee's action alleging
41. Id. at 766.
42. Malone Serv. Co., 804 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).




47. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 71-72 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied).




violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act5° and the First Amendment, 5' a
Houston court of appeals held that the testimony of an expert witness, who
was a city council member and former county attorney, as to the hesitation
by city employees to report wrongdoing and the policy of local government
officials not to disclose that information was relevant to the issue of whether
the city has a policy of retaliating against whistleblowers. 52 The Houston
court explained that the fact that the witness' opinion was based on observa-
tions made both before and after the whistleblowing employee was dis-
charged went to the weight of the witness' testimony, not its admissibility. 5 3
In another action brought against manufacturers of asbestos products to
recover for injuries to or deaths of workers, the Texarkana court of appeals
held relevant certain letters discussing the hazards of asbestos during the
1930s and 1940s to show that the dangers of asbestos were known during
that period, even though the defendant manufacturers were not aware of or
recipients of the letters, and companies involved in the letters did not make
the liquid products containing asbestos as did one defendant manufacturer. 54
While agreeing that the trial court had erroneously excluded evidence that
could have shown that defendant Johns-Manville, and not defendant
Flintkote, caused injuries to the appellees, the Texarkana court held that the
exclusion of the evidence did not require reversal because the defendants
were joint tortfeasors, and the evidence would not have supported a fact-
finding that the insolvent defendants were the sole cause of the plaintiffs'
injuries. 5 The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error on these points, 56
but later withdrew the order and denied the writ. 57
In Jones v. Red Arrow Heavy Hauling, Inc. 58 the widow of a self-employed
truck driver who had contracted to deliver freight in a trailer owned by the
defendant brought suit for breach of the defendant's contract with the driver
by withholding sums from the driver's paychecks for purposes of obtaining
workers' compensation coverage and then failing to obtain coverage. The
Beaumont court of appeals held that evidence of the widow's settlement of
the death benefits claim with the workers' compensation carrier prior to
bringing the breach of contract action was not relevant and was inadmissi-
ble. 59 The Beaumont court explained that evidence that the injured party
received benefits from a collateral source is inadmissible under the rules of
relevancy. 6°
50. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 1-6 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
51. U. S. CONST. amend. I.
52. City of Houston v. Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185, 190-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1991, no writ).
53. Id. at 191.
54. Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 668-70 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ
denied). For additional discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying note 21, and infra
notes 71-74 and 185-88.
55. Id. at 695.
56. 35 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 682 (May 2, 1991).
57. 36 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 612 (Nov. 11, 1992)(writ denied as improvidently granted).
58. 816 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).




"Evidence of an experiment made out of court is admissible only when
there is substantial similarity between conditions existing at the time of the
occurrence giving rise to the litigation and the conditions created in the ex-
periment. ' 61 In University of Texas at Austin v. Hinton62 the Austin court of
appeals held that a videotape of an out-of-court experiment was sufficiently
similar to the actual event that was the subject of litigation to show the
videotape to the jury.63 The court explained that the conditions of the oc-
currence and the experiment need not be identical and that the videotape
would not have confused the jury by causing them to believe the incident
occurred precisely as depicted on the videotape.64
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence
on special grounds such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or if the
evidence is merely cumulative. 65 The exclusion of evidence under Rule 403
is discretionary. 66 In Dudley v. Humana Hospital Corp. ,67 a Houston court
of appeals held that evidence that the defendant physician in a medical negli-
gence suit was under federal investigation for illegally dispensing prescrip-
tion drugs at the time he performed surgeries on the patient and opinion
evidence concerning effects of the investigation were properly excluded as
unduly prejudicial in a patient's medical malpractice action because there
was no evidence that the physician actually exhibited symptoms of stress at
the time of the surgeries. 68 In Farr v. Wright,69 a medical malpractice action
against a doctor who performed a discogram in the course of treatment of a
back injury, the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that the high probative
value of other cases of discitis in proving breach of sterile technique and
negligent failure to diagnose substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect
of the admission of evidence of these prior cases on the jury. 70 In Fibreboard
Corp. v. Pool,7 1 the Texarkana court of appeals held that the danger of unfair
prejudice from certain letters showing knowledge of asbestos hazards during
the 1930s and 1940s did not outweigh the overall probative value in a fail-
ure-to-warn case against asbestos products manufacturers who were not re-
cipients of the letters, even though the portion of the letters dealing with a
proposed cover-up should have been deleted. 72 The Texas Supreme Court
had granted writ of error on this point, 73 but then withdrew the order and
61. Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc. 796 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990),
abated and remanded, 35 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 725 (May 6, 1992)(remanded in aid of settlement).
62. 822 S.W.2d 197 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
63. Id. at 203.
64. Id. at 203.
65. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 403.
66. Id. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if .. " Id. (emphasis added).
67. 817 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
68. Id. at 127.
69. 833 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
70. Id. at 602-03.
71. 813 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). For additional discussion
of this case, see supra, text accompanying notes 21 and 54-57 and infra, text accompanying
notes 185-88.
72. Id. at 695.




With a few exceptions, character is not admissible to prove conduct on a
particular occasion. 75 For example, Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 404(b)
excludes from evidence "other wrongs, or acts" intended to prove the char-
acter of a person to show that he acted in conformity with that previous
conduct. 76 Such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, however,
such as proving "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident .... ",77 In Castro v. Sebesta,78 an
accident victim's case against an allegedly negligent driver, a Houston court
of appeals held that the exclusion of witnesses' testimony regarding the de-
fendant's use of drugs both before and after the accident which involved the
use of drugs was calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an
improper judgment on the issue of punitive damages, warranting reversal. 79
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 406 provides that evidence of the habit of a
person or of the routine practice of an organization is relevant to prove that
the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in
conformity with the habit or routine practice.80 In Strickland v. Coleman,81
a holder's action against the maker to recover the face value of a note, a
Houston court of appeals, citing Rule 406, affirmed the trial court's consid-
eration of all similar transactions between the parties to determine the actual
agreement between the parties. 82 The Houston court explained that the case
involved a routine practice and the course of dealing between the parties,
which was probative and admissible to prove the actual terms of the
contract. 83
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 408 excludes evidence of compromise and
offers to compromise when offered to prove liability or the invalidity of a
claim or its amount.8 4 In a former daughter-in-law's action seeking damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from a wrongful fore-
closure and eviction by her former father-in-law, the former father-in-law's
offer to establish a trust for his grandson was held properly excluded because
it was made in compromise negotiations. 85 In a products liability and negli-
gence action against a crane owner, crane distributor, and crane manufac-
turer, evidence of a "Mary Carter" agreement between plaintiff and settling
defendants was held improperly excluded, depriving a non-settling defend-
ant of his right to a fair evaluation of evidence by the jury and requiring
74. 36 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 162 (Nov. 11, 1992) (writ denied as improvidently granted).
75. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 404.
76. Id. 404(b).
77. Id.
78. 808 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
79. Id. at 193-94.
80. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 406.
81. 824 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, no writ).
82. No copy.
83. Id. at 192.
84. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 408.
85. LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
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reversal and remand in Mi-Jack Products, Inc. v. Braneff.8 6 In Mi-Jack, the
Houston court of appeals explained that Rule 408 does not limit the admissi-
bility of "Mary Carter" agreements to impeachment of the testifying
witness. s7
In General Motors Corp. v. Saenz,a8 a products liability action, the Corpus
Christi court of appeals held that it was error to exclude evidence that the
owner of the paving company who had modified the manufacturer's cab and
chassis by placing a water tank on a truck had settled claims of the survivors
of those fatally injured when the truck subsequently rolled over.89 However,
the Corpus Christi court held that the error was not reversible because there
was other evidence, including expert testimony, establishing causation. 90
V. ARTICLE V - PRIVILEGES
Article V of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs privileges. No
person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter 9' unless the rules of
evidence recognize the privilege92 or a statute93 or constitution 94 grants the
privilege. Some of the specific privileges provided in the Texas Rules of Civil
Evidence include: (1) lawyer-client privilege;95 (2) husband-wife communi-
cation privilege;96 (3) communications to clergymen; 97 (4) trade secrets;98
and (5) physician-patient privilege.99
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503 codifies the common law lawyer-client
privilege. In Cole v. Gabriel'0° a lawyer-client privilege case, an attorney
sought writ of mandamus ordering a district judge to vacate an order that
the attorney respond to questions concerning his communications to his cli-
ent. On a grant of rehearing, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the
attorney did not have standing in his individual capacity to seek a writ of
mandamus attacking the court's order respecting the privilege of his
client.' 0
In Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan 10 2 a truck driver involved in a fatal school bus
accident brought an action against the attorneys who took a statement from
86. 827 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
87. Id. at 498.
88. 829 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ granted).
89. Id. at 243.
90. Id.
91. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 501(2).
92. See id. 502-10.
93. See, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, repealed by TEX. R. Civ. EVID.
509-510 as to civil cases and TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 509-510 as to criminal cases (confidential
communications between physicians and patients relating to professional services rendered by
a physician privilege).
94. See, e.g., U. S. CONST. amend. V; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.





100. 822 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, orig. proceeding).
101. Id. at 297.
102. 822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
19931 1037
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him the day after the accident while he was still hospitalized. The driver
claimed that the lawyers, who represented his employer, told him they were
his lawyers too, and that anything he told them would be kept confiden-
tial.'0 3 With this understanding, the driver gave the lawyers a sworn state-
ment concerning the accident.104 After taking the driver's statement, the
lawyers arranged for a criminal defense attorney to represent the driver and
the lawyers who had taken the statement had no further contact with the
driver. '0 5 Some time after the criminal defense attorney had begun to repre-
sent the driver, the lawyers who had taken the statement, without telling
either the driver or his criminal defense attorney, gave the driver's statement
to the district attorney's office.' 0 6 Partly on the basis of this statement, the
district attorney was able to obtain a grand jury indictment of the driver for
involuntary manslaughter. '0 7 The lawyers moved for summary judgment on
the ground that no attorney-client or other fiduciary relationship existed.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals held that an agreement to form the
attorney-client relationship may be implied from the conduct of the par-
ties 08 and, combined with the truck driver's cooperation in giving his state-
ment, may have created an attorney-client relationship that gave rise to
fiduciary duties of good faith and fair dealing, although the lawyers did not
receive a fee from the driver. 109 Citing Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 503,
the Corpus Christi court held that certain communications between attorney
and client are privileged from disclosure in either civil or criminal proceed-
ings 110 and reversed and remanded the case for trial. 1 '
There is no lawyer-client privilege if the services of the lawyer were ob-
tained to enable someone to knowingly commit or plan to commit a crime or
fraud.' 12 During the Survey period, a Houston court of appeals held that
based on its review of the disputed documents submitted with a mandamus
petition, movants made a prima facie showing of fraud, which was sufficient
to bring the disputed documents, which bore a relationship to the alleged
fraud, within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client and work
product privileges. 113 The Texas Supreme Court agreed.' 1 4
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 505 privileges confidential communications
103. Id. at 263.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 265.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 269.
112. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503(d)(1).
113. Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 S.W.2d 853, 861-63 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
orig. proceeding) mandamus denied, Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d
223 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). For additional discussion of this case, see infra, text ac-
companying note 134-36.
114. Granada Corp. 844 S.W.2d 223.
I [Vol. 461038
CIVIL EVIDENCE
made to clergymen. 115 In Nicholson v. Wittig, 116 physicians named as de-
fendants in an underlying medical malpractice and wrongful death case filed
a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge to permit discovery
of the hospital patient's wife's conversations with the hospital chaplain.
Nicholson held that the clergy communication privilege attaches when a per-
son makes a communication with the reasonable expectation of confidential-
ity to a member of the clergy acting in his or her professional or spiritual
capacity." 17 The Nicholson court held that the privilege was not waived even
though the conversations between the hospital chaplain and the patient's
wife occurred in front of other persons because Rule 505(a)(2) expressly ac-
knowledges that others might be present while such communications were
made." 8 The court rejected the physicians' argument that because the un-
derlying proceeding was a medical malpractice case in which the testimony
concerned the care and treatment of the deceased and not matters of a confi-
dential or spiritual nature, the clergy communication privilege did not ap-
ply."19 The court also rejected the physicians' argument that because the
plaintiffs in the underlying proceeding were making claims of mental
anguish, they were attempting to make an offensive use of the clergy com-
munication privilege to prevent the physicians from learning whether the
alleged mental anguish was caused by the physicians or by plaintiffs' own
conduct, which delayed the deceased's medical treatment and surgery.' 20
The court explained that it would not accept the relators' invitation to "en-
graft an express, written exception found in the physician-patient privi-
lege 121 onto the clergy-communicant privilege."' 122 The court rejected the
physicians' argument that the chaplain should have the opportunity to deter-
mine which communications the wife made to him while he acted in his
capacity as spiritual advisor to her, and which merely concerned her hus-
band's treatment. 23 The court explained that the clergy-communicant priv-
ilege belonged to the communicant, not to the member of the clergy, and
that the clergyman should not have the opportunity to determine which as-
pects of the counseling opportunity are not privileged, reasoning that per-
sons facing crisis decisions regarding loved ones should not be required to be
guarded in their disclosures to a spiritual advisor.' 24
115. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 505.
116. 832 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
117. Id. at 685.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 685-86.
120. Id. at 686.
121. The physician-patient privilege, contained in Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 509, ex-
pressly provides exceptions to the privilege in court proceedings "when the proceedings are
brought by the patient against a physical, including but not limited to malpractice proceed-
ings," and "as to a communication or record relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or
emotional condition of a patient in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condi-
tion as a part of the party's claim or defense." Id. 509(d)(1) and (4).
122. Nicholson, 832 S.W.2d at 686.




The chaplain should not be allowed to wear two hats and switch roles
from hospital employee to spiritual advisor, depending on the nature of
the communication.... because most hospitals employ their chaplains,
this Court's ruling in favor of [the physicians'] position would have far-
reaching consequences: any individual who is counseled by a hospital
chaplain would be subject to the same possibility of disclosure of infor-
mation that rule 505's clergy communication privilege clearly intended
to remain confidential.' 25
The court held that the chaplain was an employee of the hospital was not
dispositive. 126 Nor did the fact that the hospital summoned the chaplain
have any bearing on whether the communications to him were made in his
capacity as a spiritual advisor and thus were made privately and not in-
tended for disclosure.1 27
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 510 provides for confidentiality of mental
health information. 128 An exception to the confidentiality of mental health
information exists when the disclosure is relevant in any suit affecting the
parent-child relationship. 129 In Cheatham v. Rogers130 the Tyler court of
appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 510(d)(6), which provides
that mental health records may be disclosed when the disclosure is relevant
in any suit affecting the parent-child relationship, applies to non-parties and
parties alike, and permitted a father to discover the personal mental health
records of his childrens' court-appointed psychological counselor.
Under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 511 the holder of a privilege waives
the privilege if he voluntarily discloses or consents to disclose any significant
part of the privileged matter unless such disclosure itself is privileged.'31 In
Riggs v. Sentry Insurance'32 a Houston court of appeals held that an auto-
mobile insurer did not disclose significant parts of allegedly privileged mate-
rial and did not waive its attorney-client or work-product privileges when it
responded to interrogatories by stating that the absence of coverage was its
reason for rejecting the injured passengers' offer to settle a lawsuit against
the insurer.133 In Freeman v. Bianchi134 a Houston court of appeals held
that the defendants had waived any attorney-client privilege that may have
attached to documents they submitted for in camera review where their pre-
vious disclosure to plaintiffs was made voluntarily and was neither com-
pelled or made without opportunity to raise a claim of privilege. 35 The




128. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. 510.
129. Id. 510(d)(6).
130. 824 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, orig. proceeding).
131. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 511.
132. 821 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
133. Id. at 709-10.
134. 820 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding), mandamus
denied, Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceed-
ing). For additional discussion of this case, see supra, text accompanying notes 113-27.
135. Freeman, 820 S.W.2d at 859-61.
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den of proving the disclosure was involuntary. 136
VI. ARTICLE VI - WITNESSES
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 602 provides that a witness may not testify
to a matter unless he has personal knowledge of the matter. 37 For example,
in an automobile insurer's action seeking a declaration that the insured's
policy had lapsed due to non-payment of the renewal premium, the testi-
mony of the insurer's claim specialist that the insured and another person
thought that the insured still had insurance was held beyond the specialist's
personal knowledge where the question to the witness did not indicate that
he was being asked for an expert opinion. 138
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 611 (c) permits leading questions on cross-
examination and discourages the use of leading questions on direct examina-
tion except as may be necessary to develop the testimony of a witness. 3 9 In
GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Moore, 140 the Texarkana court of appeals held
that a trial court properly excluded the defendant's former employee's depo-
sition testimony which consisted of responses to leading questions asked on
the cross-examination portion of the deposition by defendant's counsel.1 4 1
The court explained that although the witness no longer worked for the de-
fendant when she was deposed, she could still be characterized as a friendly
witness to the defense. 142
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 614, commonly known as "the rule," re-
quires a court to order certain witnesses excluded so they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses. 143 In Kennedy v. Eden,'4 a mandamus pro-
ceeding, the Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court had clearly
abused its discretion in issuing an instruction that a certain witness be pro-
hibited from attending the plaintiffs' depositions and from conversing with
other witnesses or any other person about the case, other than counsel of
record. 145 The court explained that because the trial court's order was per-
petual in duration, the witness could never talk to anyone about the underly-
ing litigation as long as the order remained in effect. 146 The court explained
that if the trial court was authorized to issue such an instruction, an issue on
which it expressed no opinion, nothing in the record before it suggested that
the trial court was justified in doing so under the circumstances. 47
136. Granada Corp., 844 S.W.2d at 226.
137. TEX. R. Cv. EvID. 602.
138. Riggs v. Sentry Ins., 821 S.W.2d 701, 708-09 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991,
writ denied).
139. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 611(c).
140. 829 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, no writ).
141. Id. at 351.
142. Id. at 351.
143. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 614.






VII. ARTICLE VII - OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. OPINION TESTIMONY BY LAY WITNESSES
The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence permit lay witnesses to offer rationally
based opinions to help clarify facts or misunderstandings.148 The rules have
greatly liberalized the admission of lay witness' opinion testimony. Texas
law has always been liberal, however, in allowing an owner of property to
offer his opinion on the property's value. 149 A property owner can give
opinion testimony regarding the value of his property even though he would
not qualify as an expert regarding the value of the same property if owned by
someone else.150 During the Survey period, one Texas court recognized the
admissibility of lay testimony by permitting an automobile owner to testify
about the cost of repairing his car.151 Another court permitted a former
resident bringing an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in
connection with a wrongful foreclosure and eviction to testify as to the value
of the property, explaining that it was within the jury's province to deter-
mine how much weight to put on her value testimony.1 52
B. TESTIMONY BY EXPERTS
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 702 permits expert opinion testimony from a
witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education."'15 3 Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 104(a) provides that prelimi-
nary questions regarding qualification of the witness shall be determined by
the court.' 54 In Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc.,155 the Texas Supreme
Court approved the admission of expert testimony from investigating police
officers regarding the inadequacy of E-Z Mart's security precautions in a
case brought by the estate of a convenience store clerk who was abducted
from the store at which he was working and murdered. 156 On remand, the
Texarkana court of appeals held that expert opinion testimony that had
there been an alarm system at the robbed convenience store at the time of
the clerk's death, the police would have had an opportunity to arrive before
she was abducted from the store was some evidence that the store's negli-
gence caused the clerk's death, but was factually insufficient to support the
jury's finding. 157
The El Paso court of appeals affirmed the admission of expert testimony
148. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 701.
149. See, e.g., Classified Parking Sys. v. Kirby, 507 S.W.2d 586, 588-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ)(owner of car stolen from parking garage competent to
testify as to car's value).
150. Id.
151. Coker v. Burghardt, 833 S.W.2d 306, 309-11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
152. LaCoure v. LaCoure, 820 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
153. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 702.
154. Id. 104(a).
155. 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992).
156. Id. at 458-60 n.4.




from a mechanical engineer as an expert in the field of earth compacting
equipment.158 A Houston court of appeals affirmed the admission of sworn
testimony from an attorney representing a party in the suit concerning the
award of attorneys' fees, holding it to be competent expert testimony.1 59
The Dallas court of appeals affirmed the expert credentials of a witness in
the field of biomechanics, affirming the admission of his testimony as to the
issue of helmet safety and how it related to a motorcycle accident.160
C. BASES OF OPINION TESTIMONY
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 outlines the proper bases of expert opin-
ion testimony. 16' If experts in the same field as the witness would reason-
ably rely on certain data, the data can form the basis of the expert's opinion
and need not be admissible in evidence.162 For example, in a condemnation
case, a real estate appraiser's expert testimony regarding the value of the
entire property before the taking and the value of the remainder after the
taking was held properly admitted even though the appraiser's opinion was
based largely on arguably inadmissible evidence of unaccepted third-party
offers to buy that property. 163 In another condemnation proceeding, one
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by al-
lowing the jury to consider the condemnees's expert's testimony that it was
"reasonably probable" in the reasonable future for the condemnee's property
to be available for commercial use, even though the opinion was based upon
the expert's experience in the real estate market and did not involve a poll of
surrounding homeowners to determine whether the majority of them would
support a change in deed restrictions prohibiting commercial use.' 64 An-
other court held that the testimony of an economist was admissible in a
negligence action against an oil company for injuries that a service station
cashier sustained in an armed robbery, even though the testimony was based
wholly upon a psychologist's report, part of which was stricken, where the
psychologist's ultimate determinations were admissible.' 65
D. OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 704 provides that testimony in the form of
an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it
158. Lujan v. Tampo Mfg. Co., Inc., 825 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no
writ).
159. Goudeau v. Marquez, 830 S.W.2d 681, 683 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ).
160. Thompson v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 824 S.W.2d 212, 218 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, writ requested).
161. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 703.
162. Id.
163. State v. Resolution Trust Corp., 827 S.W.2d 106, 108 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ
denied).
164. State v. Tigner, 827 S.W.2d 611, 613 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
denied).




embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The Texas
Supreme Court has specifically held that it is permissible to admit expert
opinion testimony on mixed questions of law and fact. 166 During the Survey
period, the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that whether a company
that sold signs to a hospital had a legal duty to inspect the signs that had
been installed by others was not an appropriate subject for expert testimony
in a negligence action by a hospital worker.' 67 The court explained that the
expert's "naked legal conclusion" that a duty exists has no probative value,
and without more, was not sufficient to carry the plaintiff's burden.' 68
E. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 705 governs the disclosure of facts or data
underlying expert opinion. 169 Rule 705 provides that the expert may dis-
close on direct examination the facts or data underlying his opinion.' 70
While paying lip service to the proposition that there is no absolute right on
the part of an expert to disclose all the facts and underlying data on which
his opinion is based, and that the better position is not to allow the affirma-
tive admission of otherwise inadmissible matters merely because they hap-
pened to be underlying data upon which an expert relies, the Amarillo court
of appeals found other grounds on which to affirm the admission of a chal-
lenged army report admitted through the testimony of an expert witness who
relied upon it.' 71 Similarly, the Fort Worth court of appeals held that any
error by the trial court in admitting hearsay data on which an expert witness
pathologist had testified was not such a denial of appellant's rights as was
calculated to cause the rendition of an improper judgment. 172
F. EFFECT OF OPINION TESTIMONY
A jury can accept lay testimony over expert testimony when presented
with conflicting evidence.' 73 During the Survey period, the Waco court of
appeals held that where expert testimony on causation did "not stand
unimpeached or uncontradicted," it was not binding on the jury. 74
166. Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem. Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987).
167. Puente v. A.S.I. Signs, 821 S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied).
168. Id. at 402.
169. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 705.
170. Id.
171. Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied). For additional discussion of this case, see infra, text ac-
companying notes 234-38.
172. Kramer v. Lewisville Mem. Hosp., 831 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ
granted).
173. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).




VIII. ARTICLE VIII - HEARSAY
A. IDENTIFYING HEARSAY
Whether a record or statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
constitutes hearsay is often difficult to determine. 175 Specifically, "[h]earsay
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant, while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted." 76 The exceptions to this general rule are set forth in rules 803
through 806.177
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered whether
proffered evidence was hearsay.17 8 In McCraw v. Marls, 179 an action to de-
termine whether the surviving spouse or the surviving children were entitled
to the proceeds of a life insurance policy, the Texas Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a duplicate beneficiary designation form constitutes hearsay,
and if it does, whether it qualified under any exception to the hearsay rule.
The duplicate beneficiary designation form had been offered to prove that
the deceased followed her usual habit of typing and filing a form from the
draft.' 80 Although the duplicate beneficiary form is an out-of-court state-
ment, the court held that it was not hearsay because it was not offered to
prove the truth of any matter asserted within it, but only that it existed.' 8 '
The supreme court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and re-
manded the cause to the trial court, explaining that the exclusion of the form
was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an
improper judgment.182
Several courts of appeals also considered whether proffered evidence was
hearsay. In Dallas County Bail Bond Board v. Black 8 3 the Dallas court of
appeals held that value placed upon real property for tax assessment pur-
poses, without participation of the landowner, is not evidence of its value for
purposes other than taxation and is considered hearsay and cannot support a
finding of fact.'8 4 In Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool,185 an action against asbestos
manufacturers to recover for injuries to or deaths of workers, the Texarkana
court of appeals held that a color poster prepared by the Oil Chemical &
Atomic Workers International Union declaring the hazards of asbestos and
175. Rules 801-06 of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence comprehensively define the Hear-
say Rule and its exceptions. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801-06. Additionally, "[a] witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has
personal knowledge of the matter." Id. 602.
176. Id. 801(d). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by law." Id. 802.
177. Id. 803-806.
178. McCraw v. Maris, 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).
179. Id. at 757.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 758.
183. 833 S.W.2d 247, 248 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
184. Id. at 248.
185. 813 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). For additional discussion
of this case, see supra, text accompanying notes 21, 54-57, and 71-74.
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stating that it is causing an "epidemic on the same scale as the bubonic
plague which killed millions during the Middle Ages," 186 was hearsay. The
Texas Supreme Court had granted writ of error to consider, inter alia, sev-
eral evidentiary points in this case, 187 the court, however, has currently
withdrawn the order and denied the writ.188
B. STATEMENTS THAT ARE NOT HEARSAY
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e) excludes from the definition of hear-
say prior statements by a witness,' 89 admissions by a party opponent,190 and
depositions. 191
1. Admissions By Party Opponents
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2) governs party admissions.192
a. Judicial Admissions
A judicially admitted fact does not require supporting evidence and the
judicial admission establishes the fact as a matter of law, thereby precluding
the factfinder from making any contrary findings. 193 A judicial admission is
actually a substitute for evidence.1 94 The Texas Rules of Civil Evidence,
while not specifically distinguishing judicial admissions from other admis-
sions, treat admissions not as exceptions to the hearsay rule, but rather as
statements that are not hearsay.' 95 During the Survey period, Texas appel-
late courts held factual allegations in a motion for summary judgment, 196
and factual statements contained in trial pleadings to be judicial
admissions. ' 97
In Miller v. Gann,198 a suit to determine whether a tract of land was
owned individually or by a partnership, a Houston court of appeals held that
one party's listing of a tract of land as community property in a property
settlement agreement incorporated as part of his divorce decree did not judi-
cially estop him from taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent case
because he did not give testimony before the court in the divorce proceed-
ing. 199 In denying applications for writ of error, the Texas Supreme Court
186. Id. at 676.
187. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 682 (May 2, 1992).
188. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 162 (Nov. 11, 1992) (writ denied as improvidently granted).




193. R RAY, TEXAS PRACTICE, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL IA
§ 1127 (3d ed. 1980).
194. Id.
195. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(2).
196. Hill v. Steinberger, 827 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
197. Thompson v. Thompson, 827 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ
denied).
198. 822 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991), writ denied per curiam, 842
S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1992).
199. Id. at 288-89.
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stated that "[t]his assertion by the court of appeals is inconsistent with the
settled law of this state. The applicability of judicial estoppel is not limited
to oral testimony, but applies with equal force to any sworn statement -
whether oral or written - made in the course of a judicial proceeding. ' ' 2°°
b. Vicarious Admissions
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2)(D) provides that statements by
agents or servants concerning matters within the scope of their agency or
employment, made during the existence of the employment relationship, are
not hearsay. 20' In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Berry20 2 the Texarkana court of
appeals rejected an argument that declarant's agency relationship was not
established because he was not identified by name. 203 The Texarkana court
distinguished Norton v. Martin2°4 explaining that Norton involved an un-
named declarant and no evidence that the declarant was even employed by
the defendant. 20 5 The Texarkana court held that where there is evidence of
employment, the failure of the witness to remember the declarant's name
affects only the weight and credibility of the testimony and not its
admissibility.20 6
Admissions made in superseded pleadings lose their binding force as judi-
cial admissions. 20 7 Admissions in abandoned pleadings, however, do have
value as evidentiary admissions and can be introduced into evidence. 208
During the Survey period, the Tyler court of appeals affirmed the admission
of an abandoned pleading to prove up factual admissions therein. 20 9
c. Co-conspirator Admissions
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2)(E) provides that statements by co-
conspirators of a party are not hearsay. 210 In Utica National Insurance Co.
of Texas v. McDonald211 the Fort Worth court of appeals held that the state-
ments implicating a party were not party admissions under 801(e)(2)(E) by
200. 842 S.W.2d at 641.
201. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801(e)(2)(D).
202. 833 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ requested).
203. Id. at 593.
204. 703 S.W.2d 267, 271-72 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
205. 833 S.W.2d at 593.
206. Id. at 593; (citing Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. North Amer. Cabinet Corp., 670
S.W.2d 387, 389-90 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ)).
207. See, e.g., Corsi v. Nolana Dev. Ass'n, 674 S.W.2d 874, 878 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi), rev'd on other grounds, 682 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1984). Admissions in abandoned plead-
ings are evidence that a jury is entitled to consider, and the probative value of the admission
against interest is a question of fact for the jury. Although any admission in an abandoned
pleading ceases to bind a pleader, such pleading remains a statement seriously made and can be
introduced into evidence as an admission. See Valadez v. Barrera, 647 S.W.2d 377, 382-83
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
208. Valdez, 647 S.W.2d at 382.
209. Willingham Auto World v. Jones, 833 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ
denied).
210. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 801(e)(2)(E).
211. 814 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied). For additional discus-
sion of this case, see supra discussion accompanying notes 9-10 and infra, notes 247- 49.
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virtue of their being made by a co-conspirator during the course and in the
furtherance of the conspiracy because no evidence other than the statements
themselves established a prima facie case of conspiracy. 21 2
C. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS: AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT
IMMATERIAL
1. Excited Utterance
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(2) admits into evidence, as exceptions to
the hearsay rule, statements relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition. 21 3 The ultimate determination as to whether a statement is ad-
missible as an excited utterance is whether it was the result of reflective
thought or rather was a spontaneous reaction to an exciting event. 2 14 Two
courts during the Survey period held statements to have been made sponta-
neously in reaction to exciting events.2 1 5 In Texas Utilities Electric Com-
pany v. Gold Kist, Inc. 21 6 the Eastland court of appeals held that the
statement of a trucking company manager that he had told the utility to
move a utility pole guy wire "a dozen times," was an excited utterance
where the traffic manager had made the statement within fifteen minutes
after the electrical lines broke and started a fire in a nearby produce ware-
house, where the traffic manager was at the scene of the fire at the time he
made the statement, and where the traffic manager was attempting to deter-
mine whether the trucking company driver had hit the utility pole guy wire,
causing the electrical lines to break and fall.2 17 In Almaraz v. Burke,2 18 a
motorist's action against the driver of a van, the Fort Worth court of appeals
held that the testimony of the investigating officer as to the van's license
plate, which number the officer had obtained from motorists who had either
been involved in or witnessed the accident, was admissible as a statement
made while under stress or excitement caused by a startling event or
condition. 219
2. Business Records
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(6) governs the introduction of records of
212. Id. at 236.
213. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(2).
214. See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Donovan, 768 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989,
no writ); First Southwest Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. MacDowell, 769 S.W.2d 954, 959 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
215. Almaraz v. Burke, 827 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied); Texas
Utilities Elec. Co. v. Gold Kist, Inc., 817 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 830 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1992).
216. 817 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 830 S.W.2d 91
(Tex. 1992).
217. Id. at 755-56.
218. 827 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied). For additional discussion
of this case, see infra, text accompanying note 252.
219. Id. at 82-83.
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regularly conducted activities, commonly known as business records. 220
Rule 803(6) requires that the records be kept "in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity" by a person with knowledge of the recorded
information and as a regular practice of the business.221 In Welex v.
Broom, 222 the San Antonio court of appeals held that an employment record
belonging to the employer of a plaintiff in a negligence case was properly
excluded as not being a business record, where the report in question was not
dated, where no effort had been made to ascertain whether the person to
whom the statements allegedly were made had personal knowledge, and
where the plaintiff's boss was unable to recall when the documents were pre-
pared and did not recall preparing reports any time soon after the accident
in question.
The 1988 amendment to Rule 803(6) added the cross reference that the
records may be authenticated by an affidavit that complies with Texas Rule
of Civil Evidence 902(10).223 Rule 902(10) permits the introduction of busi-
ness records accompanied by an affidavit that conforms to the requirements
set forth in that rule. 224 In Fullick v. City of Baytown,225 a Houston court of
appeals held that the form of the affidavit contained in Rule 902(10) was not
exclusive, and that substantial compliance with the rule would suffice. 226
Because 803(6) permits business records to be authenticated by "the testi-
mony of the custodian or other qualified witness, ' 227 two courts during the
Survey period rejected challenges to the admission of business record on the
grounds that the authenticating witness was not the custodian. 228
In GT & MC, Inc. v. Texas City Refining, Inc. ,229 a buyer's action against
a seller to establish the cost of moving oil that was kept in a tank after the
tank failed, a Houston court of appeals held that invoices held by a buyer of
an oil storage tank were admissible under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule. 230 The Houston court explained that although the invoices
were initially authored by outside vendors, employees of the buyer had
placed numerous markings on the invoices after receipt by the buyer, so that
the invoices became the buyer's primary record of information about the
underlying transaction.231
220. TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 803(6).
221. Id.
222. 806 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), judgment vacated by 816 S.W.2d
340 (Tex. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 823 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied).
223. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(6).
224. Id. 902(10).
225. 820 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ). For additional dis-
cussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note 258.
226. Id. at 945-46.
227. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(6).
228. Cockrell v. Republic Mortgage Ins. Co., 817 S.W.2d 106, 112-13 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1991, no writ); Hanks v. NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 815 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1991, no writ).
229. 822 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).




3. Public Records and Reports
Records and reports of public offices or agencies setting forth their activi-
ties or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law to which there was
a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from investigations made pur-
suant to authority granted by law, are admissible as exceptions to the hear-
say rule under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(8).232 Such public records
are admissible "unless the sources of information or other circumstances in-
dicate lack of trustworthiness. 2 33 In Beavers v. Northrop Worldwide Air-
craft Services, Inc. ,234 a wrongful death case, the Amarillo court of appeals
held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an army
report concerning the cause of a helicopter crash despite questions raised as
to the qualifications of the civilian investigator.2 35 The court explained that
the investigator's activities were only part of the report and many other per-
sons whose qualifications were not attacked were also involved in prepara-
tion of the report. 236 The court's holding found further support because the
report was undertaken in a timely manner after the helicopter crashed, and
was not prepared with litigation intentions.2 37 The court further explained
that there was a presumption of admissibility of public records and reports,
and that the party opposing the admission of such report must prove the
report's untrustworthiness, with the trial court's action on the tender being
measured by an abuse of discretion standard.2 38 Another court during the
Survey period held that affidavits regarding whether service of papers in
New York was made as required by law were hearsay and not admissible as
business records in a subsequent action in Texas seeking to enforce the New
York judgment.2 39
4. Statements in Ancient Documents
Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more whose au-
thenticity has been established are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay
rule under Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(16).240 In Fibreboard Corp. v.
Pool,241 a products liability case against manufacturers of asbestos products
to recover for injuries to or deaths of workers, the Texarkana court of ap-
peals held that letters showing knowledge about asbestos during the 1930s
and 1940s were admissible as both business records and ancient docu-
232. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(8).
233. Id.
234. 821 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991, writ denied). For additional discussion
of this case, see supra text accompanying note 171.
235. Beavers, 821 S.W.2d at 675.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 674.
239. Harbison - Fischer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp., 823 S.W.2d 679,
686 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991), judgment set aside, 840 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. 1992).
240. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 803(16).
241. 813 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). The trial court properly
refused admission of another letter in the case because no predicate was laid as to where the
letter was kept, therefore causing doubt as to the letter's authenticity. Id. at 693-94.
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ments.242 The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error to consider
several evidentiary issues in this case, 243 however, the court later reconsid-
ered and denied the writ.244
5. Statements Against Interest
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(24) admits statements against interest as
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 245 A statement against interest is one that
was at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render inva-
lid a claim by him against another, or to make him an object of hatred,
ridicule, or disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. 24 6
In Utica National Insurance Company of Texas v. McDonald247 the Fort
Worth court of appeals held that testimony that the insured's brother had
told a witness how the insured and his brother conspired to bum their home
in order to receive insurance proceeds was a statement against interest. 248
The court explained, however, that the testimony was irrelevant, and there-
fore its exclusion was not reversible error in the absence of other admissible
testimony proving that the insured engaged in a conspiracy. 249
D. HEARSAY WITHIN HEARSAY
Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule "if each
part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay
rule provided in these rules."'250 Finding hearsay contained within an inves-
tigating officers' testimony to be an excited utterance, 25' the Fort Worth
court of appeals permitted the investigating officer to testify as to a van's
license plate, which number he had obtained from motorists who had either
been involved in or witnessed the accident, because the motorists' excited
utterances would otherwise have been admissible standing alone under
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 803(2).252
IX. ARTICLE IX - AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 901 requires authentication or identification
242. Id. at 669.
243. 35 TEX. SuP. CT. J. 682 (May 2, 1992).
244. 36 TEX. Sup. CT. J. 612 (Nov. 11, 1992, writ denied as improvidently granted).
245. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(24).
246. Id.
247. 814 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied). For additional discus-
sion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 9-10 and 211-12.
248. Id. at 235-36.
249. Id. at 235.
250. TEX. R. CIv. EvID. 805.
251. For additional discussion of excited utterances, see supra text accompanying notes
213-19.
252. Almaraz v. Burke, 827 S.W.2d 80, 82-83 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
For additional discussion of this case, see supra, text accompanying note 218-19.
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of evidence as a condition precedent to admitting the offered evidence. 25 3
The authentication requirement is satisfied by evidence that is sufficient to
show that the matter in question is what its proponent alleges.254
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 902(4) treats certified copies of public
records as self-authenticating documents for which no extrinsic evidence of
authenticity is required as a condition precedent to admissibility. 25 5 In Klein
Independent School District v. Noack,25 6 a Houston court of appeals held
that a trial court erred in overruling a hearsay objection to a document that
had been offered as a public record but was not properly certified and was
not authenticated by other extrinsic evidence. 257 In another case, the same
court held that documents that were not properly self-authenticated under
Rule 902(4) because they did not bear seals were properly self-authenticated
as business records accompanied by affidavit under Texas Rule of Civil Evi-
dence 902(10), which treats business records accompanied by affidavits as
self-authenticating documents for which no extrinsic evidence of authentic-
ity is required as a condition precedent to admissibility. 258
X. ARTICLE X - CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS
AND PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X of the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence governs the admission of
the contents of writings, recordings, and photographs. 259 Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 1002 requires that contents of writings, recordings, or photo-
graphs be proven by the original writing, recording, or photograph except as
otherwise provided in the rules or by law. 26° Duplicates are admissible to
the same extent as the originals unless a question is raised as to the authen-
ticity of the original, or in circumstances where it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate. 261 In White v. Bath,262 a partnership dissolution case, the trial
court imposed discovery sanctions striking defendant's pleadings and enter-
ing a default judgment for plaintiff. During the sanction hearing, plaintiff's
counsel testified concerning what the defendant had said at his deposition.
Defendant's attorney objected, citing the best evidence rule. The trial court
overruled the best evidence objection to an answer given by plaintiff's coun-
sel concerning statements made by the defendant during the defendant's
deposition. The White court held that the best evidence rule did not apply in
this case. 263 The court explained that the best evidence rule applies only
253. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 901(a).
254. Id.
255. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 902(4).
256. 830 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
257. Id. at 797-99.
258. Fullick v. City of Bagtown 820 S.W.2d 943, 945-46 (Tex. App. For additional discus-
sion of this case, see supra, text accompanying note 225-26.
259. TEx. R. Civ. EVID. art. X.
260. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1002.
261. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1003.
262. 825 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
263. Id. at 231.
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when one seeks to prove the contents of the document 26 The aim in this
case was not to prove the contents of the deposition, but rather to determine
whether any discovery abuses had occurred. 2 6 5
Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 1006 provides that the otherwise admissible
contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be
examined conveniently in court may be presented in the form of a chart or
summary.266 In Hugh Wood Ford, Inc. v. Galloway,267 a Houston court of
appeals considered whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a
certain exhibit because it was a summary whose supporting documents had
not been supplied to the opposing party. In ruling that there was no error in
admitting the exhibit, the court explained that the exhibit was not a sum-
mary of voluminous writings that could not be conveniently examined in
court, but rather a list of extra expenses appellees claimed they incurred.268
Because both plaintiffs testified concerning these expenses, the Houston
court held that there was no error in admitting the exhibit. 269
XI. PAROL EVIDENCE
The paro' evidence rule proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence to inter-
pret a writing in some circumstances. 270 The court may allow extrinsic evi-
dence if it finds a contract to be ambiguous. 27 1 The rule prohibits parol
evidence concerning the terms in a contract if the contract is integrated.2 72
Several courts during the Survey period excluded parol evidence to interpret
an unambiguous written contact. 27 3 One court held that the parol evidence
rule did not bar extrinsic proof of mutual mistake relating to the enforceabil-
ity of a release. 27'1 Another court held that a grantee's oral disclaimer of any
interest in land that was subsequently conveyed to a purchaser through the
forgery of grantor's agent was admissible in a trespass to try title action to
show that no agreement or intent to transfer the property ever existed. 275
The Texas Supreme Court considered whether evidence from corporate
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1006.
267. 830 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
268. Id. at 298.
269. Id.
270. See RAY, supra note 193, 2 § 1601.
271. See Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981) (construction of unam-
biguous oil and gas lease).
272. Integration is the practice of embodying a transaction into a final written agreement
intended to incorporate in its terms the entire transaction. See RAY, supra note 193, 2 § 1602.
273. Simmons v. Compania Financiera Libano, 830 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Oadra v. Stegall, 828 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted); Litton v. Hanley, 823 S.W.2d 428, 429-31 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.); Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied).
274. Sweeney v. Taco Bell, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992,
writ denied).
275. Bellaire Kirkpatrick Joint Venture v. Loots, 826 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1992, writ denied).
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minutes was precluded by the parol evidence rule in Gannon v. Baker,276 a
minority shareholder's action against a majority shareholder in a corpora-
tion seeking appraisal and other relief. The trial court granted summary
judgment regarding an alleged oral agreement to "level" the parties' owner-
ship of stock once the majority shareholder's personal guaranty was no
longer needed. The minority shareholder appealed and the Houston court of
appeals affirmed.277 In reversing and remanding, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the minutes of the corporation's organizational meeting did not
reflect an agreement and, therefore, the parol evidence rule did not bar evi-
dence of an alleged oral agreement to "level" the ownership of shares once
the majority shareholder's personal guarantee was no longer needed. 278 The
Texas Supreme Court explained that here the corporate minutes did not re-
flect an agreement but merely recited the consideration for issuance of cor-
porate stock. 279 The court held that the parol evidence rule does not apply
to mere statements or recitals of past facts. 280
276. 818 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. 1991).
277. 807 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), rev'd in part, 818 S.W.2d 754
(Tex. 1991).
278. Ganon, 818 S.W.2d at 756.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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